We consider the problem of privacy (anonymity) and security in vehicular (V2V) communication, in particular securing routine safety messages. Traditional public key mechanisms are not appropriate for such applications because of the large number of safety messages that have to be transmitted by each vehicle, typically one message every 100−300 ms. We first show that a recently proposed V2V communication scheme, the TSVC, based on the Time Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA) scheme, is subject to an impersonation attack in which the adversary can distribute misleading safety information to vehicles, and propose a modification that secures it against such attacks. We then address general concerns regarding the inappropriateness of TESLA for vehicular applications (caused by the delayed authentication and buffer overflows), and propose a V2V communication scheme based on a variant of TESLA, T ESLA 0 , for which there is no delay and packets are self-authenticating. This is appropriate for applications in which vehicles are in close proximity. Finally we combine both schemes to get a hybrid communication scheme that addresses in a flexible way the mobility requirements of V2V communications.
Introduction
Vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) are emerging as one of the more interesting instantiations of mobile ad-hoc networks, aiming at enhancing road safety and transportation efficiency. In a VANET, vehicles equipped with short-range wireless capabilities are able to communicate with each other in an ad-hoc fashion (Vehicle-to-Vehicle, V2V) and with the road infrastructure (Vehicle-to-Infrastructure, V2I), forming a mesh network of nodes (1) . A number of automotive safety and convenience-related VANET applications are expected to be deployed in the near future (2) , while several proof-of-concept implementations are already in place (e.g., (3; 4)), and the technology is being standardized (5; 6).
V2V messages can be categorized into two modes of communication, namely geocast and cooperative communication. Geocast V2V messages typically support safety applications and are broadcast to neighbors within wireless range. They can further be subdivided into:
Routine safety messages. These may contain the vehicle's current position, speed, direction and time. Routine safety messages are sent on a regular basis: typically, and depending on the vehicle's speed, each node will send a message every 100 to 300 ms (7) .
Event safety messages. These are sporadic in nature, needed for collision avoidance, and are triggered by sudden changes in the vehicle's behavior (e.g., rapid deceleration, slippery road, lane merging), infrastructure notifications (e.g., traffic light status, congestion, alarm signals and instructions) or other network events; Warning messages exchanged during accidental situations, and post crash notification messages also fit to this category.
Cooperative messages can be distinguished as:
Pairwise messages. Two vehicles establish a more permanent relation, (e.g., cooperative driving, chatting).
Groupwise messages. A group of more than two vehicles (e.g., a platoon or convoy targeted for the same destination), communicate with each other frequently.
Multi-hop communication. In a cooperative network for VANET applications such as content delivery and sharing, every vehicle may also act as a partner for other nodes in a multi-hop wireless scenario (8) .
Vehicles are also able to exchange messages with the road infrastructure (V2I communication). At a high level, the infrastructure consists of front-end and backend entities. At the front-end, a number of access points, called Road Station Units (RSUs), represent the infrastructure interface to a vehicle. For example, vehicles send safety messages to RSUs or respond to RSU probes for routine or event safety messages (e.g. for congestion estimation). Or, a vehicle may ask the RSU to update its credentials or synchronize its clock. The RSUs may also send event safety messages to vehicles in their range. The back-end infrastructure can be abstracted as a Registration Authority (RA) which is typically responsible for managing the network (e.g., identity and certificate management, authorization and access control, auditing). The RA may be a single entity or a hierarchy of entities (9; 10; 11) . This infrastructure is also supposed to provide an interface to other providers of value-added services (e.g., location based, Internet access, auto-payment (12; 2)).
The security of vehicular communication has received much attention in the literature (e.g. (13; 14; 9; 15; 16) ). To thwart an internal or external adversary that replays, modifies or fabricates messages, communication should be authenticated. In addition, proper identification may be necessary in order to authorize access to services (e.g. for access control, billing purposes etc), provide personalized, context-aware content, or trace back an identity for accountability/liability purposes (e.g. credential revocation, when investigating an accident). Furthermore, VANET communication is often required to be anonymous (i.e., unlinkable and untraceable), to preserve user privacy. To this end, the privacy vs. authentication tradeoff has been an important research area for VANETs (9; 17; 18; 14; 16; 11; 19; 20; 21; 22; 23; 24; 25) .
Recently, there has also been discussion concerning the benefits and limitations of using public-key cryptography in VANETs (17; 26; 21; 27; 23; 25; 28) . In addition, non-emergency communication such as routine safety messages that are sent by vehicles every 100 − 300 ms, can be based on strict time constraints (see (21; 23; 25) ). To this end, a number of hybrid solutions have been proposed that combine asymmetric with lightweight symmetric cryptographic primitives for message authentication (e.g. (17; 26; 16; 23; 24; 25) ) or confidentiality (e.g. (21; 20; 22) ). For example in (24), the RSU behaves as an online mediator that guarantees (conditional) privacy for the vehicles and message authentication for routine safety messages. In another solution, the Timed efficient and Secure Vehicular Communication (TSVC) scheme (25) establishes anonymity for V2V routine safety messages by using a list of uncorrelated, short-lived pseudonyms that are certified by a trusted (offline) RA. Security is based on a one-way hash chain (29) and the TESLA broadcast authentication protocol (30) . More specifically, each public key authenticates a hash key chain, whose keys are released after a predefined delay and used by neighbor receivers as message authentication code (MAC) keys to authenticate a series of safety routine messages. Conditional anonymity is provided, in the sense that pseudonyms bear information that allows tracing a real-world identity. Compared to currently available public-key based schemes, the hash chain primitive is very efficient for non-emergency communication, since it only requires computing hash values.
Our contribution
We show that the TSVC protocol is subject to an impersonation attack in which the adversary may distribute misleading safety information to neighbor vehicles and propose a mechanism to fix this scheme. We then address general concerns regarding delayed authentication, strict scheduling and buffer overflow and propose a vehicle communication scheme for close proximity communication based on a variant of TESLA, T ESLA 0 , for which there is no delay and packets are implicitly authenticated. Finally we combine the two schemes to address in a flexible way the mobility requirements of V2V communications. (30) is a symmetric key broadcast authentication protocol that requires receivers to be loosely time synchronized. It uses hash chains generated by a cryptographic one-way function H. To generate a hash chain of length n, the last element, say s, is chosen randomly. Then each term of the chain is generated recursively using the relation h i−1 = H(h i ), i = n, . . . , 2, with h n = s. The chain is h 1 , h 2 , . . . , h n . Its keys h i are used to authenticate messages with a MAC, and are revealed one-at-a-time within a time interval bounded by a constant δ ms.
The TSVC protocol
TSVC (Timed efficient and Secure Vehicular Communication) (25) is a strict-schedule beacon broadcasting (application-layer) protocol that uses a hash key chain to authenticate safety messages. The hash keys are trustlinked via public keys and certificates to a certifying authority. Each vehicle has a list of public/private key pairs (P K i , SK i ), and corresponding certificates Cert i that link them to pseudo-identities P V ID i . For the purpose of traceability, a Registration Authority (RA) keeps records of the certificates and the corresponding identities of vehicles. Each key pair has a relatively short lifespan. Hash keys are linked to a particular public key P K i and used to authenticate vehicles. TSVC uses a TESLA hash chain h 1 , h 2 , . . . , h n generated by a cryptographic hash function H. Two types of packets are broadcast by a vehicle O: data packets P j and key release packets kr P j . Data packets have the form:
where P V ID 0 is a pseudo-identity for vehicle O, M j is a safety message, T j is the time when the message is broadcast, and index = j is the index of the hash key h j . The key release packets have the form: Generate hash chain h 1 , h 2 , . . . , hn Select message M 1 and set index ← 1
Following messages
Select M j and set index ← j
(i is the last succesfully received key) If no drop it, else
where h j is the hash key and T j is the time when the key release packet is broadcast. The first key release packet is authenticated using the public key of vehicle O:
In the TSVC protocol ( Figure 1 ) a vehicle O first broadcasts the data packet P j and then, after δ ms (typically δ = 100 ms), the corresponding key release packet kr P j . The vehicles in a group formation that receive data packets store these in a buffer, and check their validity when the corresponding key is released.
Each vehicle stores in a database DB, for each source vehicle O, an entry with the following information: (source, index , key, lifetime), with values P V ID 0 , i, h i , and a timer controlling how long the entry is active. This information is updated after each successful key release packet verification.
Threat model
We assume a traditional Byzantine adversary (31), i.e., the adversary is able to eavesdrop or modify the contents of the communication channels, provide inputs to honest parties, observe their outputs, and coordinate the actions of corrupted parties. All components of the VANET, including the adversary, are polynomially bounded. The adversary may be an insider or outsider that may attempt to modify messages in transit, or replay messages to disrupt the network. Additionally, the adversary is capable of interacting with other sessions of the protocol that may be executing concurrently.
An impersonation (substitution) attack
We describe an impersonation attack on TSVC in which the adversary sends misleading safety messages on behalf of authorized users. Let the vehicles O, N 1 , N 2 form a . Suppose that O has broadcast the messages:
and that just after kr P j−1 is broadcast, vehicle N 2 leaves the group formation, but is still in the range of N 1 ( Figure 3 ). Vehicle N 1 , after receiving P j and the Figure 3 An impersonation attack on TSVC key release packet kr P j = P V ID 0 , h j , index = j, T j , prepares a forged message M * j and a data packet
to be sent to Vehicle N 2 at time T * j close to T j+i , for some i ≥ 1 -which allows for i missed packets, where
The packet P * j is followed after δ ms by the corresponding key release packet
Vehicle N 2 uses the stored key value (j −1, h j−1 ) to verify that h j−1 = H(h j ) (vehicle N 2 does not check the time interval for the stored key h j in the TSVC protocol), and then verifies the MAC for M * j . Consequently N 2 will accept the (forged) message M * j as an authentic message sent by O.
This attack is a timing attack: vehicle N 2 does not check that the key release packet kr P * j contains a key h j which is for the much earlier timeslot [T j , T j + δ]. In the attack only vehicle O can be linked to the forged packet P * j . It follows that the owner of P K O (with pseudoidentity P V ID 0 ) will be traced by the RA as the sender of the (forged) message M * j , and not the adversarial vehicle(s).
Loose synchronization
Let t latency be the time it takes a message to reach a vehicle (communication latency) and δ the time taken to release a key. If the difference in time between the clock of the sender O and receiver N 2 is greater than 1 2 δ ms, then the adversary can forge the data packets of O. For example, suppose that the clock of O is 2 3 δ ms slower than the clock of a vehicle N 2 that is not in the range of O, but in the range of an adversarial vehicle. Then the adversary can forge the message and MAC of the first data packet P 1 of O and forward the forged data packet so the N 2 gets it at (local) time T 1 + 1 3 δ + t latency , where T 1 is the time P 1 was sent by O, with the key release packet following after 2 3 δ ms. Vehicle N 2 will get the key release packet δ ms after time T 1 + t latency , where T 1 + δ is the certified time in the key release packet -vehicle N 2 does not use its own clock to check the actual time that P 1 was sent. To avoid such attacks we require that δ >> t latency + 2δ clock , where δ clock is an upper bound on the time differences of the clocks of all vehicles. A discussion of approaches to time-synchronization in VANETs is given in (25; 30) . Typically, vehicles are synchronized via an external source, such as GPS signals. Or, the road infrastructure (i.e., an RSU) could regularly broadcast the certified time.
A fix for the TSVC protocol
The problem with the TSVC protocol (Figure 1 ) is that the receivers do not check the validity of the hash key h j for the transmission interval of the data packet. Although the packet P j sent by O is timed (with timestamp T j ) and the key release packet kr P j is timed (with timestamp T j ), and the receiver checks that the listed times are within acceptable bounds, the receiver does not check that the value of the key h j listed in the key release packet is correct for the transmission time interval (the value of index can be forged). The adversary can exploit this weakness and undermine the security of TSVC.
To fix the TSVC protocol we have to make certain that the receiver vehicle uses its own clock to determine that the appropriate key for the transmission interval is 
Vehicle(O)
Receivers(N 1 , N 2 . . . , N m )
First Message :
If for some integer j ≥ i :
Then accept and update DB :
Discard expired entries from DB used, and does not rely on the value of index in the key release packet. We shall assume that clocks are highly accurate, but not necessarily synchronized. However we assume that the difference in time between the clocks of all the vehicles is bounded by a constant δ clock that is significantly less than the key release time: δ clock << δ. Let T j = T 1 + (j − 1)τ , j = 2, 3, . . . , be the times when vehicle O broadcasts its data packets (typically τ = 300 ms), and T j = T j + δ be the times it broadcasts the key release packets (typically δ = 100 ms). To check the transmission time, the receiver vehicle, say N , uses the first data packet P 1 sent by O. If this is received at time T , and if T 1 is the time listed in P 1 , then the difference in time should be bounded by:
where t latency is the communication latency; for a 1000 m range this is bounded by 10 ms (25). Furthermore, if the clocks are accurate then Equation (1) must apply to all subsequent times T j , j = 2, . . . , n. It follows that when, later on, vehicle N receives a data packet P from O, if the local time (determined by the clock of N ) is T , then |T j − T | ≤ t latency + δ clock , for some integer j.
If the packet P is followed shortly by the key release packet kr P when the local time is T , then we must have T − (T j + δ) ≤ t latency + δ clock . Consequently,
Observe that vehicle N relies totally on the time of its own clock to determine the validity of packets: it does not need a timestamp from O nor the value of indexwhich may be forged. By synchronizing its clock to the clock of O using the (digitally signed) timestamp T 1 of the first key release packet kr P 1 , it can compute on its own the relevant time-periods. N only needs the key h j : if this arrives during the correct local time-period, then the data packet is authentic. In Figure 4 we illustrate the necessary modifications to secure TSVC.
Unsuitability of TESLA for V2V applications
There are four major concerns regarding the use of TESLA for securing V2V communications.
1. TESLA is not appropriate for highly dynamic group configurations, with vehicles leaving or joining groups very frequently (16).
2. TESLA is not appropriate for delay intolerant networks (16) . In TSVC, the verification of a data packet is only possible after its key is released, and there is a delay in validating safety messages. Apart from delay-tolerant applications designed for VANETs (32), V2V routine messages are considered as delay-intolerant data (16).
3. TESLA is subject to buffer overflows (33) . This may cause a denial-of-service (DOS) attack, in which the attacker floods receivers with invalid messages.
4. TESLA does not support non-repudiation: after the hash key is released it is easy to forge messages.
Concern 1 is partially addressed by having vehicles regularly re-broadcast their first message, in particular whenever a new vehicle (with a new P V ID) sends a data packet (not necessarily the first packet). Concern 2 is partially addressed by having a short key release time δ. In the following section we shall consider a protocol that uses a variant of TESLA, T ESLA 0 , for which there is no delay and packets are self-authenticating. This mechanism also addresses Concern 3. As for Concern 4, TESLA should not be used to protect event safety information, where the source must be identifiable.
Security vs reliability
The value δ = 100 ms of the key disclosure delay is chosen so that routine safety messages can reach all vehicles in the full transmission range of the source O (typically up to 1000 m (25)). For a vehicle 10m away from O, having to wait 100 ms before a safety message can be validated, may be too long for some safety applications, e.g., for close proximity manoeuvering. One may therefore want to adopt a more flexible approach that distinguishes neighbor vehicles, e.g. those less than 50m away, from vehicles further away. We shall describe such an approach below.
Synchronized vehicular communication

The T ESLA 0 authentication protocol
0 is a variant of TESLA in which a hash chain is used for origin integrity (authentication): each key is released together with its data packet (δ = 0) and used as a token to identify the sender. The tokens are "self destructing" authenticators: they are valid only if "seen" during the period (T j , T j + ε), where T j is the time the key was sent and ε > 0 a time-bound. This period must be very short, with ε less than the time a man-in-themiddle attack takes.
Consequently any message attached to the token is implicitly authenticated, provided it is "seen" during the period (T j , T j + ε). There is an affinity between interactive zero-knowledge proofs (34) and T ESLA 0 authenticators. For both: (i) only the receiver (verifier) gets convinced of a certain truth (in T ESLA 0 : "that the sender is authentic"), and (ii) the evidence of the proof can easily be generated after the protocol is executed (in T ESLA 0 : "the packet can be forged"). T ESLA 0 authenticators are non-interactive and inherently oneto-many, so appropriate for broadcast applications. However their shelf life is short and restricted to settings with synchronized clocks. The protocol uses strict-schedule broadcasting, with the j-th packet P j , j = 1, 2, . . . , sent at time:
The first packet
includes the timestamp T 1 for the start time (chosen arbitrarily by each vehicle), the first key h 1 , a message M 1 , a digital signature:
and the certificate Cert O . The following packets are of the form:
and do not include a MAC, a timestamp or an index.
Let ε be a lower bound for t latency + t f orge − δ clock , where t latency is the communication latency, t f orge the time it takes to forge a data packet (essentially, to read a hash key, and deliver the forged packet), and δ clock the time discrepancy between clocks. We shall assume that the clocks of all parties are accurate, and that δ clock is significantly less than ε: δ clock << ε.
The shelf life ε should be sufficiently small to make it impossible for the adversary to forge packets. Whenever P j is received, for some integer j > i, where i is the index of the last validated packet of P V ID 0 , the receiver checks that: (i) |T − (T 1 + (j − 1)τ )| < ε, where T is the time P j was received-receivers use their own clocks, and (ii) h i = H j−i (h j ) -this allows for (j − i) missed packets. Packets P j that satisfy both constraints are valid. All other packets are discarded. Note that the time it takes to validate a packet may be more than ε: it is therefore important that T is calculated using the recorded time when P j is received, not after it is checked.
T ESLA 0 does not provide explicit data integrity, since the packets do not contain a MAC. However it does provide implicit data integrity assuming that: (1) the message is "seen" within the period (T j , T j + ε), where ε is sufficiently small to prevent the adversary from substituting the original message, and (2) we have origin integrity.
Vehicular communication based on T ESLA 0
We now present a variant of TSVC (as modified in Section 2.6) that uses a T ESLA 0 hash chain for close proximity communication to address impersonation attacks, packet delays and buffer overflows. The protocol is illustrated in Figure 5 .
As in TSVC, each vehicle has a list of public/private key pairs, pseudonyms, and certificates that link the vehicle identifier to the pseudonyms for conditional traceability. Note that this does not provide assurance against non-repudiation: an adversarial vehicle can transmit malicious packets P * j and later, after the key is released, repudiate them. This applies to all TESLAbased schemes.
Packets are broadcast at regular intervals (strictschedule broadcasting) and authenticated using the T ESLA 0 protocol, with each vehicle O broadcasting a data packet P j at time T j = T 1 + (j − 1)τ , j = 1, 2, . . . , n. The first data packet P 1 (Equation (2)) includes the pseudonym P V ID 0 for vehicle O and the transmission time T 1 , authenticated by the digital signature σ. If it is received at time T bounded by:
where ε is a short time interval (Section 3.1), then it is accepted as authentic. The receiver also keeps an entry in DB: (P V ID 0 ; index ← 1, key ← h 1 ; T 1 ; ε 0 = T − T 1 ; timer ← (n − 1)τ ), where timer controls the lifetime of the hash chain session.
Let ε 0 = T − T 1 and δ 0 be a short time interval (typically δ 0 ∼ 0.5 ms) to allow for vehicle mobility (in a 
∧ ∃ PVID 0 record in DB Then accept and store in DB :
Following messages Select
Let T be the local time when N receives P j ; get the PVID 0 key (i, h i ) from DB If for some integer j > i :
Discard expired entries from DB range of 30 − 50 m). The value ε 0 + δ 0 is used to time all future readings of the receiving vehicle. For the following time intervals, if a data packet P j sent by O is received at local time T (of the receiver) then the receiver checks that:
where i is the index of the last validated packet from O, and that:
. If these hold then P j is accepted as authentic and the receiver updates the entry of P V ID 0 in DB with new values: index ← j, key ← h j and timer ← (n − j)τ . When the timer reaches 0, the P V ID 0 entry is discarded.
Our T ESLA 0 -based communication protocol is suitable for settings where the communication latency is sufficiently small (typically 3−5 ms-see also Section 5.2) to make it difficult for the adversary to forge packets. For VANETs this setting covers either unsaturated conditions with medium-to-long communication range (typically, up to 1000 m (5)) or saturated, city traffic conditions with very short range transmissions (typically, below 100 m) to reduce communication latency (35) . For all other cases, as for example in saturated conditions where we would also like to warn cars at the maximum range, the TSVC scheme should be used.
A hybrid scheme
We can combine TSVC and T ESLA 0 to get a hybrid authentication scheme that aggregates their strenghts with only marginally more overhead than TSVC. The hybrid scheme uses two hash chains: {h j } for TSVC and {h 0 j } for T ESLA 0 . These are linked to the sender with the digital signatures σ, σ 0 and the certificate Cert 0 . The first data packet P 1 of the hybrid system is obtained by appending to the corresponding packet of TSVC (the modified version in Section 2.6) the T ESLA 
When a vehicle N receives P 1 it records the time T it was received and stores in a database DB the record: (P V ID 0 ; T 1 ; T ; (1, h 0 1 ); timer ). Then it checks that: If these hold then it accepts M 1 as implicitly authenticated. Otherwise vehicle N waits δ ms for the key release packet:
which contains the TSVC key h 1 and the signature σ = sig SK O (h 1 ) that link it to the sender, to verify that M AC = M AC h1 (M 1 ) directly. If P j is authentic then the record of P V ID 0 in DB is updated.
The j-th packet, j > 1, of the hybrid scheme is:
The time T it is received and the key h 0 j are used for close proximity (implicit) authentication. If i is the index of the last received valid packet, then we require that: (1) |T − T j | < ε 0 + δ 0 for some j > i, and (2) h
If these are satisfied then M j is accepted and the record of P V ID 0 updated. Otherwise vehicle N waits δ ms for the key release packet:
that contains the TSVC key h j used to verify M AC = M AC h1 (M 1 ) directly, and authenticate M j explicitly. If P j is authenticated then the record of P V ID 0 in DB is updated.
The threshold ε 0 + δ 0 , the waiting time δ, and the frequency τ of transmission are system parameters. To deal with buffer overflow issues packets that are broadcast outside the expected times: T j = T 1 + (j − 1)τ and T j = T j + δ, are discarded (we allow for a small deviation, that is at least as large as the upper bound δ clock for the time discrepancy of clocks).
In the following sections we shall see that the hybrid scheme addresses a major weakness of TSVC (the disclosure delay δ dominates the communication latency-Section 5.2) and that on average it only requires 8 bytes more than TSVC (taken over 1, 000 packets-Section 5.1).
Security analysis
Protection involves privacy (anonymity) and integrity. The privacy adversary tries to identify the source O of the transmitted packets, whereas the integrity adversary tries to forge the packets of O. Privacy is assured because O uses the pseudonym P V ID 0 . We have (conditional) unlinkability because the pseudonym of O for each session is linked to independent public keys P K O .
The T ESLA 0 integrity adversary may try to forge packets of O within the range of vehicle O, or beyond its range. Since it is hard to forge the key h 0 j (this follows from the fact that a cryptographic one-way function is used to generate hash keys and a digital signature scheme is used to link it to the sender) and its lifespan is short (less than the time it takes to deliver a forged packet), the adversary cannot send forged packets P * j to a vehicle N in the range of O before N gets the authorized packet P j from O (the adversary needs to get the key h 0 j contained in P j to forge it). This proves integrity for the close proximity authentication scheme based on T ESLA 0 . Forging packets beyond the range of O takes even longer, and therefore is thwarted. The security of the TSVC component of the hybrid scheme is based on the security of TESLA (25).
Efficiency
The hybrid scheme distinguishes between close proximity V2V coommunication (low communication latency) and communication with vehicles further away (high latency). For close proximity communication there is no key disclosure delay in the T ESLA 0 component (δ = 0). As a result, there is no delay in validating safety messages. This can important for safety applications, e.g., manoeuvering vehicles in close proximity to a sender O do not have to wait 100 ms before validating safety messages. When communication latency is high (e.g., in saturated traffic with long range communication), the TSVC component is invoked.
Bandwidth efficiency
Assume that n = 1000 routine safety messages are sent at 300 ms intervals, and that the ECDSA (36) signature scheme is used, combined with the SHA-1 algorithm (37) for hashing. The length of the first data packet of the hybrid scheme is, 
Communication latency
Packet delivery delay is the delay between the time a packet was generated and the time the packet is successfully received. It includes the transmission time, the propagation time, and the medium access time (e.g., due to backoff, busy channel, inter-frame spaces (38; 39)):
In the TSVC protocol received packets are buffered, and only validated when the key release packets are received, which is after δ = 100 ms. Validation is done at the upper (application) layers. It follows that the actual communication latency of TSVC is:
where t application includes all delays at the upper layers (e.g., queuing, processing, etc). For the TESLA 0 communication protocol the key release packets are sent together with the safety packets. So,
As an illustration, suppose that the transmission rate is 6 Mbps (the base rate of 802.11a) and the range is 1 Km. Then the transmission delay for a 500-byte routine safety message is roughly:
and the propagation time is:
t propagation = 1 Km 3 * 10 5 Km/s = 1 3 * 10 5 s = 3.3 µs, assuming an electromagnetic wave velocity of 3 * 10 5 Km/s. The delays from upper-layer processing, in particular computing (verifying) a MAC are also small. For example, SHA-1 of 500-byte data can be computed on a 2.2 GHz AMD Opteron 8354 in less than 0.5 µs (40), so the upper layer latency is:
The medium access control layer delays are harder to estimate as the collision probability in a VANET varies with the vehicle density, the velocity of vehicles and other factors (41) . Typical estimations (42; 43) are based on simulations that distinguish between unsaturated traffic (no more that 10 vehicles per Km) and saturated traffic (greater than 100 vehicles per Km). The medium access delays for the TSVC protocol are estimated for both simulations in (25) . The simplest case is with unsaturated traffic for which we get the upper bound t mac = 1 ms for a transmission range of 1 Km (42). For saturated traffic the estimated delays are higher-e.g., an upper bound of 14 ms for a transmission range of 1 Km is given in (42) . To keep delays below 10 ms the authors in (35; 43) propose to reduce the broadcast range to less than 200 m. For this range, t mac ∼ 9 ms. Using Equation (3) this gives us: t latency unsat (T SV C) ∼ 2 ms + δ, and t latency sat (T SV C) ∼ 10 ms + δ.
In both cases the delay δ = 100 ms in releasing the authentication keys dominates the latency, which highlights a basic weakness of delayed authentication. Of course we can reduce the delay to say, δ = 10 ms. However one has to be careful when reducing the key release time in case that for some vehicles (in the extremes of the broadcast range) the keys arrive before the safety messages are processed, which may result in attacks of the type described in Section 2.4.
Our hybrid approach is designed to address such issues, in particular to exploit the "quadratic" reduction effect on saturated traffic with close proximity communication. More specifically, 100 vehicles in a 1 Km range are reduced to 100 × ( 100 1000 ) 2 = 1 vehicle in the 100 m range. Consequently even when the traffic is saturated in the 1 Km range, in the 30 − 50 m range where the TESLA 0 communication protocol is used the number of vehicles cannot be more than 10, so the latency for unsaturated traffic applies. For this range using the simulations in (42) we get: t mac < 1 ms, so that from equation (4) we have:
It is clear that a hybrid approach that distinguishes short range communication from long range communication to address traffic density has to be adopted, for the safety packages to be secured.
Collisions with strict-schedule broadcasts
The TSVC protocol as well as our modification in Section 2.6 and the TESLA 0 vehicular communication protocol rely on strict-schedule beacon broadcasting (typically every τ = 300 ms). This means that a collision of packet P j will affect the whole broadcast stream of data packets P j , P j+1 , P j+2 , . . . -assuming the parties involved adhere strictly to their schedule.
We distinguish three cases: (i) the lead data packets P 
Performance comparison
Impact of Vehicle Density. There are no packet delays (PD) with T ESLA 0 . Consequently for low density (typically highway) traffic there is little variance in PDs and in the packet ratio loss (PRL) between TSVC and the hybrid scheme. However with high density (typically city) traffic, as observed in Section 5.2, there is a significant improvement since the latency for short range communications in the hybrid scheme (when T ESLA 0 is used) approximates that for low density traffic.
Impact of Vehicle Moving Speed. A range of 10 − 40 m/s is considered with the traffic simulations in (25) for initial inter-vehicle distance 30 meters. It is shown that for TSVC the PD is within the maximum allowable 100 ms latency and the variation of speed does not significantly impact the PD and PLR.
For the hybrid scheme with communication in the 1000 m range there is no difference (TSVC is invoked). However for short range communication (< 100m) there are no PDs and PLR is reduced to the low density traffic case.
Conclusion
We have shown that the TSVC scheme is subject to an impersonation attack and proposed a modification that addresses such attacks. We have also proposed a vehicular communication scheme for close proximity formations based on a variant of TESLA, in which messages are self-authenticated. Finally we have combined this scheme with the modified TSVC scheme to address dynamic vehicular group formations.
